Abstract
One of the most important debates in the philosophy of memory is the causalism versus post-causalism debate. On the one hand, causalists defend the thesis that remembering requires a causal link via memory traces to a past experience. On the other hand, post-causalists deny that such causal link is necessary for remembering. Recently, some philosophers have suggested that Simulationism, particularly its anti-causalist thesis, is inconsistent with empirical findings about memory traces. In this paper, I analyze these findings and argue that although many of them favor Causalism and seem inconsistent with Simulationism, memory traces also provide data that are inconsistent with Causalism. For this reason, I defend that it is premature to dismiss any of these theories in light of the current evidence on memory traces.
Abstract
This paper offers a critical overview of the evolving debate on the accuracy conditions of episodic memory. We argue that the positive proposals articulated in the context of this literature are actually attempts to answer related but ultimately different types of questions. After presenting our overview of the debate, we discuss four lessons that can be drawn from it. While we do not put forward a substantive account of the accuracy conditions of remembering, we believe that these lessons contribute to advancing the debate by providing the grounds for more nuanced and rigorous engagement among philosophers interested in the accuracy conditions of episodic memory.
Abstract
There are two competing and sometimes neglected assumptions in the philosophical discussion on the success and accuracy of episodic memory. In this paper, I articulate them and argue for one of them. Most philosophers assume that the success of a mnemic representation should be assessed holistically, with all of its elements having equal weight in the success of the memory. Some philosophers, in contrast, assume that the success of a mnemonic representation depends on specific relevant elements. I defend the latter assumption using the paradigmatic case of inquiries. I argue that social norms regarding memory prioritizes the accuracy of certain elements in inquiry contexts. In these contexts, the inquiry selects which elements are relevant to the success of episodic memory.
Abstract
The (dis)continuism debate in the philosophy of memory revolves around the question of whether memory and imagination belong to the same natural kind. Continuism, on the one hand, defends that they belong to the same natural kind. Discontinuism, on the other hand, defends that they do not belong to the same natural kind. By adopting a minimal notion of natural kind, one can recognize that there are different legitimate ways of sorting kinds, which lead to different positions in the debate. In this paper, I interpret continuism as a mechanistic thesis, according to which memory and imagination belong to the same natural kind because they are underpinned by the same constitutive mechanism. I clarify the implications of this thesis and show that most of the discontinuist attacks on continuism do not constitute a challenge to the mechanistic thesis. I also present a possible challenge to mechanistic continuism. This suggests that there may be multiple (dis)continuism debates.